California Supreme Court Ruling Lowers the Bar on Recovering Emotional Distress Damages

The California Supreme Court recently issued a ruling in Downey v. City of Riverside (Cal., July 22, 2024, No. S280322) 2024 WL 3491142, which lowers the bar to recover emotional distress damages in a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).

California courts have long recognized a plaintiff’s right to recover in negligence for serious emotional distress suffered from witnessing injuries inflicted on a close relative. Recovery for such damages is available only if the plaintiff “is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim.” (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 668.) The common plaintiff is a parent who witnesses as a negligent driver collide with her child. The parent, who is contemporaneously aware of the driver’s negligent conduct, as well the child’s resulting injury, is able to sue the driver for her own emotional trauma. (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728). In the recent ruling in Downey v. City of Riverside, the Supreme Court found that a Plaintiff had adequately pled a claim for NIED because she had heard, over a phone call, a motor vehicle accident that seriously injured her daughter, despite the fact that she was not physically present at the scene and could not visibly observe the injury-causing event.

In Downey, the Supreme Court considered a new issue: whether a Plaintiff was entitled to emotional distress damages when she was aware that an injury had been inflicted on her daughter but was not aware of the defendant’s role in causing the injury. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that because Plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the injury-producing event and that it had inflicted an injury on her daughter, she did not need to plead awareness of the defendant’s role in causing the injury to have adequately pled her claim.

The plaintiff in Downey, Jayde Downey, was providing driving directions to her daughter, Malya Jane Vance, over the phone when her daughter was severely injured in a car crash, allegedly as a result of the condition of the roadway and overgrown vegetation at a nearby residence. Downey heard the collision and its immediate aftermath, including the fact that Vance was no longer speaking and a stranger at the scene told Downey to “quiet down” so he could “find a pulse” on Vance. However, as Downey was not at the scene, she did not contemporaneously observe what had caused the collision.

Subsequently, Downey brought a claim for NIED against multiple defendants. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer finding that Downey’s complaint was “insufficient to show that Downey had a contemporaneous awareness of the injury-producing event — not just the harm Vance suffered, but the causal connection between defendants’ tortious conduct and the injuries Vance suffered.” (Vance v. City of Riverside, 2021 WL 11697514, at *1 (Cal.Super.).)

On appeal, Downey argued that the NIED cause of action “does not require as an element that the plaintiff visualize the event or show knowledge of the connection between the tortious nature of the defendants’ conduct and the victim’s physical injuries.” (Downey v. City of Riverside (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1033, 1039, rev’d and remanded (Cal., July 22, 2024, No. S280322) 2024 WL 3491142). In a split decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Downey’s argument and sustained the trial court’s ruling.

The California Supreme Court granted review to address the issue of whether a plaintiff has adequately pled an NIED claim where the plaintiff is aware that injury has been inflicted on the victim, but not aware of the defendant’s role in causing the injury.

Relying upon a number of historical cases involving NIED claims, including Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 667–668, the Supreme Court found in favor of Downey and reversed and remanded the decision to the trial court. In coming to its conclusion, the Supreme Court cited the rule articulated in Thing:  

“[A] plaintiff . . . may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress . . . .”

(Id.)

Applying that rule in Downey, the Supreme Court reasoned that it is the awareness of an event that is injuring the victim, and not the awareness of the defendant’s role in causing the injury that matters for purposes of determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to emotional distress damages. Here, Downey alleged she knew Vance had been involved in an accident because she heard, through the phone, the sounds of an explosive metal-on-metal vehicular crash, shattering glass, and rubber tires skidding or dragging on asphalt, and she knew Vance had been seriously injured because she stopped speaking, and a bystander was checking for a pulse. The Supreme Court held that Downey’s claim was adequately pled, and that the Court of Appeals had erred in concluding that Downey was required to allege awareness of how the defendants contributed to the injury. The Supreme Court held that Thing did not require a plaintiff to know of the role that the defendants may have played in causing the injury-producing event to allege an NIED claim, and it declined to impose that additional limitation.

Notably, the Supreme Court did not expressly consider whether Downey being on the phone with Vance at the time of the accident, as opposed to physically at the scene, constituted being “present at the scene of the injury-producing event,” as required in Thing, because the parties did not dispute that Downey’s virtual presence was sufficient to support her claim.

However, the Supreme Court’s ruling that Downey’s claim was adequately pled has raised concerns among some legal professionals that it opens the door to unlimited liability in a day and age where technology allows people to remotely perceive events through the phone and many other mediums. Thus, it is important to be aware of the limitations that remain on a bystander’s recovery for negligently caused emotional distress. Although a plaintiff need not understand, at the pleading stage, how each tortfeasor has contributed to the injury to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must: (1) be closely related to the injury victim; (2) contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event and the fact that it caused injury to the victim, as opposed to viewing or learning about the injurious consequences of the defendant’s conduct after the fact; and (3) suffer severe emotional distress. (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 668; Downey, supra, 2024 WL 3491142.) Such limitations will continue to restrict NIED claims, despite the lower bar to support a claim resulting from the Downey decision.

For more information or specific guidance, please contact Karen Porter or Chelsea Cortes.